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Abstract Vitalism was long viewed as the most grotesque view in biological theory: 
appeals to a mysterious life-force, Romantic insistence on the autonomy of life, or 
worse, a metaphysics of an entirely living universe. In the early twentieth century, 
attempts were made to present a revised, lighter version that was not weighted down 
by revisionary metaphysics: “organicism”. And mainstream philosophers of science 
criticized Driesch and Bergson’s “neovitalism” as a too-strong ontological commit-
ment to the existence of certain entities or “forces”, over and above the system of 
causal relations studied by mechanistic science, rejecting the weaker form, orga-
nicism, as well. But there has been some significant scholarly “push-back” against 
this orthodox attitude, notably pointing to the 18th-century Montpellier vitalists to 
show that there are different historical forms of vitalism, including how they relate to 
mainstream scientific practice (Wolfe and Normandin, eds. 2013). Additionally, some 
trends in recent biology that run counter to genetic reductionism and the informa-
tional model of the gene present themselves as organicist (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000, 
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Moreno and Mossio 2015). Here, we examine some cases of vitalism in the twentieth 
century and today, not just as a historical form but as a significant metaphysical 
and scientific model. We argue for vitalism’s conceptual originality without either 
reducing it to mainstream models of science or presenting it as an alternate model 
of science, by focusing on historical forms of vitalism, logical empiricist critiques 
thereof and the impact of synthetic biology on current (re-)theorizing of vitalism.
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DOI 10.2478/kjps-2018-0006
1. Introduction
Vitalism was long considered to be the most grotesque view in the spec-
trum of biological theories: an appeal to a mysterious life-force, Romantic 
insistence on the autonomy of the living, or worse, a metaphysics of an 
entirely living universe. It traditionally served as a foil for both biology 
and philosophy, being attached to metaphysical and nondeterministic 
claims, i.e. the hypothesis of nonmaterial vital forces governing the gen-
eration, development and vital functions in living beings. Depicted as 
a chronic epistemological disease, or an “obstacle épistémologique” as 
Bachelard1 would have put it, nonmaterial vitalism has been harshly crit-
icized by philosophers: mainstream philosophers of science, but also, 
Mikhail Bakhtin2 have justifiably criticized the “neovitalism” of Hans Dri-
esch (discussed in section 3 below) and Henri Bergson3 as a too-strong 
ontological commitment to the existence of certain entities or “forces”, 
over and above the system of causal relations studied and modeled by 
mechanistic science, which itself seeks to express these entities or the 
relations between them in mathematical terms.
Such philosophers also tended to reject the weaker form of this view, 
organicism, which was popular in the emerging theoretical biology of 
the time,4 despite the attempts that were made in the early twentieth 
century to present a revised, lighter version of vitalism that was not 
weighted down by revisionary metaphysics (in P.F. Strawson’s sense of 
1  Bachelard 1938.
2  Bakhtin 1926 [1992].
3  On the Bergsonian dimension, see Wolfe and Wong 2014 and Wong 2016.
4  Peterson 2010, Peterson 2017.
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a metaphysical program aiming, not just to describe the world but to 
revise our understanding of it, notably by “adding” to it, typically in the 
case of self or agency, but in this case, of vital forces or powers5). We 
will return to organicism below but to dispel any initial ambiguities, we 
use this term to refer to family of theories and models, in theoretical 
biology and philosophy of biology, which seek to describe laws or prop-
erties specific to organic life, without particular metaphysical baggage 
inasmuch as this is possible. 
Thus in this context, vitalism is typically understood as the view at 
the utmost margins of the development of modern biology, that life is 
somehow to be understood as possessing a mysterious “vital force” or 
“vital principle”, apart from the causal, experimental world studied by 
natural science. Thus Francis Crick could predict, in full genocentric 
self-confidence, in his 1966 Of Molecule and Men: “To those of you who 
may be vitalists, I would make this prophecy: what everyone believed 
yesterday, and you believe today, only cranks will believe tomorrow.”6 
Indeed, vitalism, broadly understood as the commitment to the existence 
of irreducible vital properties or dispositions seems to have constantly 
been challenged – and threatened – by the development of chemistry and 
the possibility to reduce biological processes to a set of physico-chemical 
reactions. In the last decade, a novel and powerful take on the nature 
of life emerged, at the interplay of molecular biology and computer 
science, namely “synthetic biology”, whose avowed goal is to produce 
living systems by means of their constituents (in bottom-up or top-down 
approaches), endowed with basic living processes (discussed in section 4 
below). It seems at first view that the successes of synthetic biology 
would mean the defeat of any vitalist view. 
However, there has been some significant scholarly push-back against 
this orthodox attitude, notably pointing to the Montpellier vitalists of the 
18th century, and emphasizing that there are different historical forms 
of vitalism, including in their relation to the mainstream practice of sci-
5  The descriptive metaphysician has the more modest task of elucidating our existing 
conceptual schema while the revisionary metaphysician has the speculative task of in-
venting a new conceptual schema (see Strawson 1959, Preface); “Revisionary metaphysics 
seeks to change our ways of thought in directions it finds necessary” (Blackburn 2003, 61). 
6  Crick 1966, 99.
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ence.7 It resulted in an effort to contextualise the idea of vitalism within 
a “historical epistemology” of the life sciences, yielding historical dis-
tinctions between, e.g., Montpellier vitalism (associated with prominent 
18th-century doctors and professors at the Montpellier Faculty of Med-
icine) and a more embryology-based vitalism in Germany with Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach8 and Hans Driesch in the 19th and early 20th cen-
turies.9 Here, vitalism is the name for a theory which seeks to do jus-
tice to the specificity of certain types of entities in a more naturalistic 
context; these entities can be variously defined or polarized as living 
versus dead bodies, physiological versus anatomical objects of study, 
organisms versus machines, and so on. In parallel to this reevaluation 
of vitalism by historians of science, some trends in recent biology that 
run counter to genetic reductionism and the informational model of the 
gene, place themselves under the heading of this concept which they 
prefer to name organicism.10 
What happens if we return to the challenge of the anti-vitalist argu-
ments formulated by the Vienna Circle and its successors, and look at 
vitalism in the twentieth century and today, not just as a historical form 
but as a significant metaphysical and/or scientific model? Is it possible 
to grasp some of the conceptual originality of vitalism without either (a) 
reducing it to mainstream mathematicocentric models of science (in a 
kind of “victors’ narrative” in which proper science is formalizable, math-
ematically specifiable research) or (b) just presenting it as an alternate 
model of science? In other words, without either normalizing it or pro-
jecting a kind of “weak messianic power” onto its supposed abnormality, 
in which organicist-type thinking recurs despite successive mechanis-
tic, genetic and otherwise reductive demystifications?11 In this paper we 
sketch three responses to the above problem: (i) a “historicist” argument 
that if one takes seriously the diversity of forms of vitalism, it becomes 
7  The topic of Wolfe and Normandin, eds. 2013.
8  Blumenbach 1791.
9  See Duchesneau and Cimino eds. 1997 and Gambarotto 2018. On vitalism in early 
20th-century thought see Nouvel ed. 2011, Wolfe and Normandin eds. 2013.
10  Gilbert and Sarkar 2000, Moreno and Mossio 2015; discussion in Wolfe 2014.
11  Wolfe 2014, 2015.
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impossible to sustain “true/false” judgments about vitalism as such, 
minimally, and further, it becomes possible to conceive of more natural-
istic, less metaphysical forms of vitalism (section 2); (ii) a comparative 
argument about the concepts of atom and entelechy in logical empiricist 
critiques of vitalism, showing that there is a way of evaluating Driesch’s 
doctrine of entelechy as a non-metaphysical doctrine (section 3); (iii) a 
“presentist” argument in which we refute the idea that a synthetic and 
engineering approach to life would definitely refute any form of vitalism 
(section 4). 
2. The Enlightenment: Structural-Functional Vitalism
The great French clinician and theorist of the early nineteenth century 
Xavier Bichat wrote that the Montpellier physicians, that is, the physicians 
associated with the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Montpellier 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, “considered science phil-
osophically; they would have made greater [scientific] progress if they 
had known more anatomy.”12 Yet when we consider the body of writings 
produced by the “Montpellier vitalists” (the term “vitalist” is first used 
widely in French to refer to this school), including Théophile de Bordeu, 
Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Chambaud, Henri Fouquet, Paul-Joseph Barthez, 
we find almost no traces of such metaphysically laden vital forces. They 
are not metaphysicians of life but médecins-philosophes seeking to model 
concepts of organism, or as they would have put it, the “animal econ-
omy,” which can be understood as a predecessor term of “organism”. 
Following the fundamental work of Rey, Duchesneau et al. and Williams,13 
who have done much to put it on the map, we have argued elsewhere14 
that the Montpellier vitalist school expresses a “structural-functional” 
form of vitalism, with the celebrated image of the bee-swarm (found in 
Maupertuis, Bordeu, Diderot and also Ménuret de Chambaud) expressing 
the structural relation between one life and many lives.
12  X. Bichat, Discours sur l’étude de la physiologie, included in Bichat 1800.
13  Rey 1987/2000; Duchesneau et al. 1997; Williams 2003.
14  Wolfe and Terada 2008, Wolfe 2010, 2015.
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In his article on “Observation” in the Encyclopédie, Ménuret mentions 
the bee-swarm and Bordeu in order to emphasize that life in the body 
occurs, or is best described as, a “connection of actions” (“liaison d’ac-
tions”): 
“One could, following these authors, compare man to 
a flock of cranes which fly together, in a particular order, 
without mutually assisting or depending on one another. 
The Physicians or Philosophers who have studied and care-
fully observed man, have noticed this sympathy in all ani-
mal movements – this constant and necessary agreement 
in the interaction of the various parts, however disparate 
or distant from one another; they have also noticed the dis-
turbance of the whole that results from the sensory dis-
agreement of a single part. A famous physician (M. de Bor-
deu) and an illustrious physicist (M. de Maupertuis) likewise 
compared man, from this luminous and philosophical point 
of view, to a swarm of bees which strive together to hang 
to a tree branch. One can see them pressing and sustain-
ing one another, forming a kind of whole (une espèce de 
tout), in which each living part contributes in its way, by the 
correspondence and direction of its movements, to sustain 
this kind of life of the whole body, if we may refer in this 
way to a mere connection of actions (liaison d’actions).15
What the “vitalist” Ménuret is doing here with the bee-swarm metaphor 
for the animal economy (or “organism” in our vocabulary) is asserting a 
structural, relational, positional approach to what makes living bodies 
unique. One should also note the presence of (partly) mechanistic lan-
guage in his descriptions (more than in Bordeu’s for instance), with the 
language of “springs” (ressorts). Similarly, one should note that even if we 
are faced with a form of holism here (as the idea of a “Life” composed of 
smaller “lives” makes explicit), it is a holism where componential analysis, 
that is, analysis of the properties of the parts, still plays a role. In that 
sense, not only is the form of vitalism expressed in the above passages 
15  Ménuret 1765, 318b–319a.
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far removed from claims about mysterious vital forces; this structur-
al-functional approach to life is also closer to materialism than is often 
said, if we notice the appeal to a kind of vital materiality.
The structural-functional understanding of living systems, again, does 
not appeal to a special “substance” to define them, but rather to what 
von Bertalanffy would have called in the twentieth century, an “organiza-
tional” understanding: “There is no ‘living substance’ because the charac-
teristic of life is the organization of substances.”16 In his fascinating and 
quite programmatic article in the Encyclopédie on the notion of “animal 
economy”, Ménuret defines the latter term as “l’ordre, le méchanisme, 
l’ensemble des fonctions & des mouvemens qui entretiennent la vie des 
animaux.” This is neither a strictly anatomical perspective on organisms, 
nor one appealing to an immaterial vital principle, including the soul. 
Rather, the vitalist interest here is on the type of articulation of the parts 
in an organism: both the specificity of the relation between the parts, 
and indeed the specificity of the material properties of these parts (i.e. 
the organs) themselves.
Enlightenment vitalism is different from vitalism as understood by (or 
rather feared by) the mainstream philosopher of biology or biologist 
(an understanding to which we return below) because it is more of an 
attempt to model the organizational, systemic properties of organisms 
than a positing of animas or immaterial life-forces, the latter implying 
a form either of overt substance dualism (e.g. soul vs. body, in which 
the soul is the life principle) or at least an argument that differentiates 
between living and non-living, or organic and inorganic systems, on the 
basis of a substantial difference. Vitalism is then a concept, or perhaps 
a family of concepts, implicated in a series of tensions and quarrels for 
legitimacy in the self-definition of the biomedical sciences. In addition, 
it seems to come in more or less metaphysical forms. We then need to 
achieve some conceptual clarity regarding this diversity, and to inquire 
into its metaphysical status.
16  von Bertalanffy 1933, 48 (he expands on the idea of the organism as a system of 
relations on the next page).
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3. Saving Vitalism (and Materialism) from Metaphysics: Entelechy 
and Atom
We have already encountered Crick’s dismissive attitude towards vital-
ism – in his case, Driesch’s vitalism – in his 1966 book.17 In the following 
year this book was reviewed by the distinguished biologist C.H. Wadding-
ton in Nature. In response to Crick’s aggressive claim, Waddington raised 
the following question concerning “odd” entities in modern physics: “Is 
a quark included? And if biologists should find it necessary to postulate 
an entity as odd as a quark, would that be vitalistic or not?”18 Among 
physicists the status of the quark is still a controversial topic. In general, 
a quark is postulated as a more “fundamental” constituent of matter. Yet 
in some sense it is legitimate for Waddington to claim that a vital agent 
such as Driesch’s entelechy, upon first impression, is as odd as a quark. 
This is easy to understand. Driesch’s doctrine of the entelechy was widely 
cited (and then dismissed).19 For Driesch, an entelechy is a non-material 
vital agent which is partly responsible for some organismic functions. 
Importantly, the entelechy, studied exclusively in biology, makes biol-
ogy essentially irreducible to physics and chemistry. But the entelechy, 
according to Driesch, is invisible and thus inaccessible to sense experi-
ence. In like manner, a quark is also unavailable to direct observation. 
However, we know that physicists could insist that the quark exists, while 
present biologists are not allowed to do the same with the entelechy.
If the existence of the quark is still a controversial matter in modern 
physics, the reality of the atom is undisputed. In fact, in the eyes of 
modern biologists and philosophers of biology, the affirmed existence 
of the atom in modern physics implicitly supplies the strongest ground 
to dismiss vitalism as a metaphysical heresy, from which biologists are 
supposed to distance themselves in order to secure biology as a respect-
able science, and this concerns a metaphysical or ontological belief about 
the ultimate constituents of the world. According to Ernst Mayr, modern 
biologists do not oppose what he terms “constitutive reduction,” which 
17  Crick 1966, 99.
18  Waddington 1967, 203.
19  Driesch 2002 [1905].
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suggests that biological phenomena, events, and processes are merely 
“the constituents of which they are composed.”20 More explicitly, with 
a specific reference to vitalism, the philosopher of biology David Hull 
asserts that “both scientists and philosophers take ontological reduction-
ism for granted. Vitalism is dead. Organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, 
and that is that.”21
We do not know how many scientists and philosophers implicitly pre-
suppose this metaphysical belief. But seen from the case of Mayr and 
Hull, this belief is quite influential and appears to decisively expel vital-
ism from the biological realm. Let us term this belief metaphysical mate-
rialism, which indicates that the ultimate constituents of the world are 
atoms (or materialistic entities) and nothing else. It is obvious that this 
formulation contradicts, and consequently leaves no room for vitalism, 
which claims on the contrary that in the biological realm organisms are 
governed by entelechies.
The reasons for rejecting vitalism are clear, and the gist is that meta-
physical materialism is presupposed, rather than defended with solid 
arguments, as the correct account of the world. But could we argue for 
metaphysical materialism? In the first place, metaphysical materialism 
seems closely connected with human intuition. Human beings encoun-
ter material objects in the spatial-temporal world. We are familiar with 
the table used in daily life, and intuitively take it as an inalienable part 
of the world. on the basis of this intuition plus some modern physical 
knowledge it is then suggested that the table has atoms, exclusively, as 
its micro-constituents. Moreover, it is somehow further asserted that not 
only material objects, but also biological and even psychological objects 
are nothing but atoms and their micro-configurations. Through these 
bold assertions, metaphysical materialism builds itself as the dominat-
ing worldview, which claims to have captured the ultimate constituents 
of the world and in principle is able to make sense of everything else.
However, at first sight metaphysical materialism is hardly compatible 
with modern physics, even though it embraces some of its basic concepts 
20  Mayr 1988, 11.
21  Hull 1981, 282.
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such as the atom. In modern physics it is not clear how concepts such 
as field, energy, and force could receive adequate materialist interpreta-
tions22. In response to this defect, the more popular version of material-
ism in metaphysics today is termed physicalism.23 Now, like materialists, 
physicalists also make assertions about the ultimate constituents of the 
world. This time it is stated that everything in the world is nothing but 
physical in nature. Even though in the non-physical sciences it is unclear 
how their concepts can be reduced or even related to the ultimate phys-
ical constituents, metaphysicians still strongly believe that since they 
hold the ultimate in hand, concepts currently used in non-physical sci-
ences and new concepts postulated in all sciences will finally turn out to 
be or at least build on physical concepts anyway. The logical empiricist 
Herbert Feigl is quite clear about this strategy: “the game of the radical 
physicalists” is “that whatever they deal with turns out to be physical!”24
Yet these metaphysical claims are at odds with scientific practice. 
Metaphysically-minded philosophers do not bother themselves with the 
sciences or their historical progress. Just because of this, their nega-
tive claims against vitalism are not at all adequate in the eyes of logical 
empiricists and scientific philosophers. In the rest of this section we 
propose a different, non-metaphysical manner of comprehending these 
issues concerning vitalism and materialism. This new perspective has 
logical empiricists (and some early twentieth century biologists) as its 
adherents and shares little interest in postulating the ultimate constit-
uents of the world.
First, logical empiricists dismiss metaphysics as raising meaningless 
questions. For logical empiricists, traditional metaphysics makes claims 
about the ultimate constituents of the world, yet these claims largely 
remain at the speculative level with little empirical evidence. This attitude 
applies to metaphysical versions of both vitalism and materialism. Con-
cerning materialism, Feigl complains that “science is still identified with 
an absurd mechanistic reductionism.”25 Another logical empiricist and 
22  Wolfe 2016, 129.
23  Ney 2008.
24  Feigl 1971/1981, 364–365.
25  Feigl 1949/1953, 8.
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physicist, Philipp Frank, also criticized idle formulations of metaphysi-
cal materialism. Concerning the concept of the atom, Frank claims that 
“matter and atom” are merely auxiliary concepts in modern physics, but 
these concepts are mis-applied to “everything in the world.”26
Second, as a result, for logical empiricists it is not legitimate to reject 
vitalism by presupposing metaphysical materialism, which is meaning-
less in itself. In other words, it is legitimate, at least at the early stage 
of advancing hypotheses, to invoke materialistic as well as vitalistic con-
cepts. Therefore, at the hypothetical level both the atom and the entel-
echy should be permitted. This attitude is supported by major logical 
empiricists, who never take Driesch’s doctrine of the entelechy as a 
metaphysical heresy. For instance, Frank claimed that Driesch’s intro-
duction of the entelechy into biology “certainly means going beyond the 
frame of physical laws, but in no way an abandonment of the ground of 
empirical science.”27 Frank also wrote extensively on vitalism. Despite 
his later criticisms, in his early years Frank even felt obliged to support 
vitalism against metaphysical materialism [mechanism], claiming that: 
“To be sure, Driesch shows that we can assume for the 
living processes a specific state variable, not that we must. 
For it is not possible to foresee every trick that one might 
invent in the fiction of hidden combinations of inorganic 
state variables. In favor of vitalism I should like to remark 
that, just as I cannot force someone who regards heat as 
a specific state variable to consider it as a motion of parti-
cles, so I cannot force the adherents of entelechy to replace 
it by fictitious state variables.”28
Here Frank anticipates the strategy used by metaphysical materialists: 
for whatever biological phenomenon, the causes are to be found among 
“inorganic state variables” such as the atom. Frank dismisses this strat-
egy as illegitimate, merely relying on a verbal trick. An “inorganic state 
variable” remains fictitious, until one demonstrates how it causes biolog-
26  Frank 1949, 74.
27  Frank 1932 [1998], 111.
28  Frank 1908/1941, 26–27.
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ical change. Further, as Frank’s final statement implies, in formulating 
hypotheses a truly scientific mind should be neutral towards materialistic 
and vitalistic concepts, and the latter could not be rejected by presuppos-
ing materialism. Overall, from the logical empiricist point of view, if one 
bothers himself/herself with the question of the ultimate constituents 
of the world, the postulate of the entelechy is as heretical as that of the 
atom; but in formulating hypotheses, the entelechy is as legitimate as the 
atom. In this way, Waddington’s question can be satisfactorily answered 
by logical empiricists. Waddington is not mistaken in claiming that the 
entelechy is as odd as the quark. They are both hypothetical entities, the 
evaluation of which should be solely based on empirical evidence. To 
emphasize, naturally, the quark cannot appeal to materialist and phys-
icalist metaphysics for its source of legitimacy. Similarly, in the case of 
vitalism, to paraphrase Alexander Gurwitsch, a distinguished biologist 
and contemporary of Driesch, “practical vitalism claims the right to be 
restricted in formulating hypotheses only by postulates of logic and of 
the general theory of knowledge, and by nothing else.”29
In sum, according to logical empiricism it is incorrect, as Bakhtin, Crick 
and many present biologists and philosophers do, to dismiss vitalism 
as a heresy because it violates materialist and physicalist metaphysics. 
It is also illegitimate to take atoms to be the ultimate constituents of 
the world, as if they grounded everything else, and discard entelechies 
because of this metaphysical bias. The final point to make about the 
logical empiricist perspective is that materialistic and vitalistic concepts 
are both legitimate at the hypothetical level, and their validity is only to 
be decided on the basis of later empirical evidence. The validity of mate-
rialistic and vitalistic concepts is an entirely different matter: it is solely 
relevant to the logic of science. Briefly, the history of science indicates 
that the concept of the atom has had great empirical success in modern 
physics since the nineteenth century; but the entelechy did not meet with 
similar success, and was finally discarded. Though space is lacking to 
elaborate the logic and the history, the legitimacy of the entelechy at the 
hypothetical level should now be clear, and we hope this section has indi-
cated how vitalism (and materialism) could be saved from metaphysics. 
29  Gurwitsch 1915, 765.
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4. Synthetic Biology, Vitalism and the Definition of Life
Vitalisms, as previous sections have shown, are various and do not 
necessarily entail metaphysical claims or the positing of immaterial life 
forces. More than a rebuttal, vitalism calls for a precise historico-philo-
sophical characterization. In his Introduction to Canguilhem’s The Nor-
mal and the Pathological, Foucault stressed a “paradoxical fact in the 
life sciences”: while the “scientificization process is done by bringing to 
light physical and chemical mechanisms . . . it has on the other hand, 
been able to develop only insofar as the problem of the specificity of life 
and of the threshold it marks among all natural beings was continually 
thrown back as a challenge.”30 To Foucault, this paradox however does 
not mean that vitalism is “true”, but rather that it still plays “an essential 
role as an indicator in the history of biology”: an indicator of problems to 
be solved (what constitutes the originality of life without constituting an 
independent empire in nature?), an indicator of reductions to be avoided 
(emphasizing the pervasiveness and necessity of concepts of preser-
vation, regulation, adaptation). But what does happen to this heuristic 
value of vitalism when biology shifts away (or claims to) from its descrip-
tive goal and turns to making life itself? When it explicitly challenges 
this supposed “specificity of life” and aims at overcoming this intuitive 
threshold? What are in this context the effects of the actual developments 
and achievements in synthetic biology – a discipline heavily relying on a 
machine analogy – on vitalism? Does a synthetic approach to life dispel 
this supposed fecundity of vitalism?
In 1828, whereas the use of vital forces31 was still massive in the recent 
field of organic chemistry to account for the difference between the living 
30  Foucault 1991, 18.
31  After the Lavoisierian revolution in chemistry, physiologists and organic chemists 
attempted to understand the chemical changes that living bodies undergo notably by 
developing a research program aiming at increasing the knowledge on the nature and 
composition of substances of biological origin. However, those investigations showed 
that, from a chemical viewpoint, there was no difference between mineral and biological 
bodies: the same elements in certain cases would produce inorganic compounds, and in 
others organic compounds. Thus the question of the reason of biological organization 
arose, and vital force seemed a convenient and accurate answer to that debated issue. 
Note that the precise role and nature of vital forces – are they considered the real cause of 
biological organization or do they emerge from the chemical constituents? are they mere 
Authenticated | ctwolfe1@gmail.com author's copy
Download Date | 8/23/18 5:54 PM
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 20, 2018
Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of Lisbon University
Metaphysics, Function and the Engineering of Life: the Problem of Vitalism
126
and the non-living at a molecular level32, the achievement of the synthesis 
of urea from ammonium cyanate by the German chemist Friedrich Wöhler 
seemed to put an end to vitalist speculations by showing that nothing 
in vital matter needed more than ordinary chemistry to be assembled. 
Although the narrative of this founding myth has been challenged by his-
torians33, its very existence is not without relevance to us since it embod-
ies the age-old conflict between biological and chemical sciences, the 
former having been repeatedly challenged by the reductionist claims of 
the latter. Vitalism, minimally defined as the commitment to the irreduc-
ible nature of living processes to a set of straightforward chemical reac-
tions, nonetheless survived this first synthesis of an organic compound; 
its supporters argued that urea was not a genuinely vital substance, but 
merely an excretion34, whose chemical status lied somewhere between 
the organic and the inorganic. While, throughout the 19th century, the 
boundary between complex molecules and the organized living system 
(at the cellular level) was considered impossible to cross artificially, it 
still remained a hotly debated topic and an object of speculation. In his 
Biologie synthétique Leduc for example stated that: 
“When we know the physical underlying mechanisms for 
the production of an object or a phenomenon . . . it be-
comes possible to reproduce it . . . and science becomes 
synthetic. Biology is a science like any other . . . it has to be 
sequentially descriptive, analytic, and synthetic.”35
More recently, in 2007, a Nature editorial described the development 
of synthetic biology (SB) as an “antidote” to “chronic vitalism.” SB, whose 
name rightly evokes synthetic chemistry, inherited from artificial life36 
as well as from bioinformatics and was developed by scientists trained 
epistemological tools aiming at orienting research or real forces acting upon matter? – 
is however disputed among historians. See Wolfe 2011, Richards 2000, Zammito 2012, 
Duchesneau 1997, Gambarotto 2018. 
32  See for example Berzelius 1814.
33  Brooke 1968, Ramberg 2000, Tomic 2012.
34  See for example Müller 1834.
35  Leduc 1912.
36  Langton 1989.
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in engineering sciences such as Drew Endy.37 Using tools borrowed from 
those disciplines, SB relies on the rational design of bioparts (BioBricks38), 
or microorganisms (standardized biological chassis) and aims at con-
ceiving and building biological systems endowed with basic robust and 
predictable functions.39 Gayon40 has identified at least 7 different uses of 
SB in the literature, covering 4 fundamental meanings: the synthesis of 
artificial life (including the synthesis of analogs of living systems, such as 
physico-chemical or computational models), the artificial synthesis of life 
(the assemblage of living organisms by the assemblage of organic parts), 
the modification of existing organisms and the biological engineering 
of hybrid forms (molecular computation). Interestingly the first three 
trends explicitly refer to “life”. While SB promises to tackle fundamental 
theoretical issues – such as the definition of life – with new experimental 
opportunities, it is obvious that all those trends do not presuppose the 
same epistemological roots, nor do they undertake the same research 
strategies. Described as an “umbrella term“41, SB actually gathers three 
heterogeneous streams of practice: 1) the engineering of genetic circuits 
with DNA-based construction42, 2) the engineering of entire genomes that 
introduce synthetic genomes within bacteria chassis43, 3) and bottom-up 
programs such as the quest for realizing protocells44. Tasks 1) and 2) 
seem to confront life directly: they aim to “domesticate”, “redesign” or 
“direct” life for human and social purposes. As Endy45 puts it, SB seeks 
to “generate, transform or evolve biological systems in order to control 
or use them for concrete, biotechnological goals, with an immediate 
application in the world of human needs.” In order to fulfill this domesti-
37  Lazebnik 2002, Endy 2005.
38  BioBricks are small DNA modules, i.e. standardized units of functions – coding se-
quences, regulatory elements, linker sequences, etc.
39  Endy 2005.
40  Gayon 2013.
41  O’Malley et al. 2008.
42  Smolke 2009.
43  Venter 2010, Gibson et al. 2010.
44  Rasmussen et al. 2009.
45  Endy 2005.
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cating task, SB explicitly relies on the three engineering Rs46: Rationality, 
Robustness and Reliability, as opposed to the whimsicality, inconstancy, 
and variability found in natural systems. Here in order to realize their 
synthetic life forms bioengineers assume a given cellular machinery, 
therefore their engineering of genomes and of genetic circuits merely 
displace the vitalist challenge to biochemistry. On the contrary the pro-
tocell program, intends to construct not only genomes, but also the 
whole cellular system within which a genome becomes functional. For 
this purpose, it acknowledges some fundamental properties of life (such 
as metabolism, self-replication, heredity and evolvability). In this case, 
the challenges are no longer the constitution of a functional genome, 
which mostly relies on computing, but also the construction of a lipid 
membrane, likely to display all properties required for maintaining cel-
lular homeostasis, thermodynamics stability, etc.47 What does it mean 
for vitalism in this context? 
In the Nature editorial, vitalism is depicted as a disease, often fought 
by the assaults of chemical and physical sciences, but never completely 
eradicated by them. It strategically refers to the belief in a “qualitative 
difference” between inert and living matter as well as the intuition that 
“life appears when a threshold is crossed”. In that respect vitalism would 
entail two minimal claims: 1) the idea that life constitutes a “natural kind”, 
i.e a category that exists in nature, as opposed to human concepts; 2) the 
supposed irreducibility of living matter to its inert constituents. Depend-
ing on our understanding of what “irreducible” means – epistemologi-
cal or ontological – one could in turn conclude to the impossibility of a 
transition from the inert to the living, or of the generation of life out of 
brute matter, and claim the necessity of immaterial vital forces in order 
to account for that apparition. It is doubtful whether this metaphysical 
and caricatural form of vitalism survived the development of biology in 
the 20th century (aside from creationism, or its contemporary avatar, 
Intelligent Design), it rather seems – as argued in section I of the paper – 
that if one were to speak of contemporary forms of vitalism, those would 
be compatible with physicalism and emphasize (instead of the existence 
46  Pleiss 2006.
47  Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno 2013.
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of an ontologically distinct living matter) the complexities of living pro-
cesses, their subtle organization and self-organization.48 Still, Nature’s 
editorial narrow characterization of vitalism as a metaphysical stance 
is a classic rhetorical strategy amongst scientists and philosophers49 
in order to dispel any form of vitalism. Strikingly, the Nature editorial 
identifies, in passing, the metaphysical form of vitalism described above 
with the many attempts made by scientists to define life, thus conflat-
ing the search for a definition of life and nonmaterial vitalism. We might 
then question the relevance of such a connection: does the search for 
a definition of life necessarily lead to (metaphysical) vitalism? And does 
synthetic biology successfully deflate this so-called vitalist intuition of 
an essence of life? 
If the notion of life was relatively overlooked during the 1960–1990s, 
notably because of the groundbreaking work of molecular biology and 
the subsequent conviction that the secret of life lied in genetic informa-
tion and in the existence of a genetic code through which it could be 
expressed50, it seems to have resurfaced with the development of a new 
peripheral discipline in the 1990s, namely astrobiology, and was subse-
quently reactivated in evolutionary biology, molecular biology, artificial 
life, and later, during the 2000s, synthetic biology.51 There is little doubt 
that through its engineering approach, in which it strives to fabricate liv-
ing-systems from scratch, SB has dramatically contributed – among the 
disciplines cited above – to discard the idea of a frontier between the liv-
ing and the inert.52 In that respect, coupled with prebiotic chemistry and 
astrobiology, SB could be described as an experimental and synchronic 
approach to the diachronic and historical problem of the origin of life. 
The established possibility to synthetize, create and assemble genu-
inely living-systems by means of their components alone invalidates the 
ancient metaphysical form of vitalism that emphasized the irreducible 
nature of vital matter. By blurring the frontier between the inert and the 
48  Varela 1979, Normandin and Wolfe 2013, Moreno & Mossio 2015.
49  Bernard 1878, Nagel 1961, Hempel 1966.
50  Watson 2004.
51  Morange 2003, Machery 2012.
52  Rasmussen et al. 2009.
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living, SB ends up challenging the existence of the notion of life itself, 
even though it contradicts one of SB’s major avowed goals: elucidate the 
nature of life. In line with François Jacob’s famous statement according 
to which biologists no longer study “life” in the lab, but merely “analyze 
living systems, their structure, their function, their history,”53 proponents 
of synthetic biology seem to have contributed to dismiss the adequacy 
of this fuzzy and confounding concept from biology.
From that vantage point, synthetic biology would be the achievement 
of a century-long effort made to discard the legitimacy of essentialism in 
empirical sciences.54 Since science, according to Popper, does not aim at 
knowing the true nature of things (their essence), but rather at describing 
and explaining their behavior with hypothetical universal laws, defini-
tions themselves are useless to empirical sciences. Raising the question 
of the true nature of something (life, matter, etc.) is thus both mislead-
ing (it offers an erroneous conception of scientific tasks) and inefficient 
(it is source of sterility). True scientific knowledge does not derive from 
speculative definitions that strive to capture the essence of a thing, 
but from empirically testable hypotheses. Because it lacks the empirical 
grounding and the universal explanatory power that scientific concepts 
must display, the notion of life is not a scientific concept: it does not 
belong to hypotheses that strive to account for a given class of observ-
able phenomena. Or if it does, it fails to grasp the universality it seeks, 
as argued by Cleland55: “our current scientific understanding of life is too 
limited to support a theoretically useful tentative generalization about 
all life.” In accordance with Popper’s analysis of scientific activity, driven 
by empirically testable hypotheses and theories, Gayon56 argues that this 
lack of definition of the word “life” has deep historical roots, and relates 
to the history of biology itself, understood as the science that “studies all 
and only the different forms and manifestations of life.” 57 The success of 
53  Jacob 1971.
54  Popper 1945.
55  Cleland 2012.
56  Gayon 2010, 2011.
57  On the distinction between biology and natural history and the constitution of “life” 
as a scientific problem, see Foucault 1966. 
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the term “biology” in the 19th century58, Gayon argues, is less due to the 
attempts made by physiologists, physicians, zoologists, etc. to define 
“life” than to the development of general theories, able to encompass all 
the phenomena and beings that we intuitively classify under the word 
“life” (cellular theory, evolutionary theory, biochemistry and molecular 
biology)59. Those sub-disciplines – while they never attempted to define 
“life” – have provided strong evidence that living beings share a number 
of properties that distinguish them from any other natural beings. If it 
could be tempting to conclude from there to the possibility of defining 
life itself, precisely by extracting the most general features encountered 
in those sub-disciplines (membranes and metabolism, reproduction and 
evolvability, etc.), Gayon warns philosophers and scientists that a defini-
tion of life can be nothing but stipulative, relative to a particular theory: 
“such a definition will always be conventional, and for this reason, the 
wisest attitude that we may have is to accept that it is open to change, 
in response to new knowledge.”60 This, of course, recalls Pascal’s defi-
nition of scientific definitions,61 that are to be understood as pragmatic 
and conventional tools precisely because they don’t target the essence 
of things, but only the meaning words have in a given context for the 
individuals who use them. 
Whereas a definition is a theoretical construction that aims at captur-
ing the universal content of the term defined, an operational criterion 
more resembles a set of properties that an item has to realize/possess 
in order to belong to a given class of phenomena or objects. While the 
development of new disciplines – astrobiology, artificial life and origins of 
life62 – has arguably in the past 20 years reactivated the need for a stip-
ulative definition of life, and triggered considerable scientific and philo-
sophical efforts63, this occurred as avenues to forge operational criteria 
58  On the history of the word “biology” see Mc Laughlin 2002. 
59  See Gayon 2004, 2008. 
60  Gayon 2011.
61  See for example De l’esprit géométrique et de l’art de persuader, and the Lettre à Le 
Pailleur circa January 1648. 
62  Bersini & Reisse 2007.
63  Cleland & Chyba 2002, Bedau 2010, Bryulants, Bartik & Reisse 2010.
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rather than as attempts to seek an essential definition. Aside from the 
disputable feasibility and efficiency of such attempts, it is clear that they 
do not entail any commitment to the existence of life as an ontologically 
separate category. Moreover, from what precedes it is unclear whether 
scientists seek a genuine definition of life – be it stipulative – or simply a 
set of operational criteria that enable them to rightly classify an item. In 
that respect the NASA definition of life, “Life is a self-sustained chemical 
system capable of undergoing Darwinian evolution,” is less a definition 
than a set of operational criteria aiming at distinguishing living forms 
from other natural beings. 
It is noteworthy that SB tackles the question of the definition/ iden-
tification of life from a synthetic perspective. Unlike other biological 
disciplines, SB does not have an analytic approach to its object, but 
quite literally builds it. Doing so, it contributes to dissolve the border 
between the living and the non-living, advocating for continuity. This 
experimental challenge to the concept of boundaries: living – non-liv-
ing, natural – synthetic is not the least service SB provided biology. We 
have already noted, in passing, the manifest paradox that affects SB: it 
seeks to increase our knowledge on life through its fabrication. Focus-
ing on the rational making of novel organisms, SB explicitly refers to 
an epistemological tradition that seeks knowledge through fabrication: 
verum et factum convertuntur, as Giambattista Vico put it: the princi-
ple of maker’s knowledge. Bioengineers embrace this epistemological 
assumption that relies on a mechanistic ground: knowing is tantamount 
to taking things to pieces and putting them back together64. The chemist 
Marcelin Berthelot65 had exposed the view that chemistry literally fabri-
cates its object, and that chemists know it only insofar as they fabricate 
it. The object of knowledge becomes transparent to knowledge because 
it is made by humans’ hands. Only a few SB papers don’t quote Richard 
Feynman’s famous adage: “What I cannot create I do not understand”.
Two difficulties arise then. The first one concerns the narrative of SB 
itself and the discrepancy between what it does and what it says. For 
instance, SB contributes to blur the boundary between the living and the 
64  Lazebnik 2002.
65  Berthelot 1860.
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non-living, triggering new efforts in the definition of life beyond cate-
gories, while it exalts its capacity to create novel organisms, i.e. while 
it acknowledges the very boundary it contributes to dispel. The second 
relates to the difference between natural and synthetic life forms. Since 
SB does not limit itself to dismantle existing organisms and to recon-
struct them, but aims at creating objects that don’t exist in nature66, 
it addresses life not only as we already know it, but as it could exist: 
it explores processes and organizational structures that are alien to 
evolved terrestrial life. In light of those two paradoxes, it may thus be 
argued that far from dismissing any form of definitional effort, SB forces 
us to undertake such an effort, in the light of its experimental outcomes. 
Exploring those continuums would only be an antidote to an immaterial 
and metaphysical form of vitalism. Functional vitalism as well as attitu-
dinal, or epistemic, vitalism67, because they don’t violate physicalism, 
are not dismissed by the development of SB, quite the contrary. They 
seem totally in accordance with the protocell research program, which 
seeks the conditions for self-organization, precisely by acknowledging 
fundamental features of living entities. 
5. Conclusion
It is easy to reject vitalism as a metaphysical heresy. Yet the metaphys-
ical criticisms of the most notorious form of vitalism, that is, Driesch’s 
doctrine of entelechy, are far from fair. As we saw in section 3, Driesch 
never intended his vitalism to address a metaphysical point, so that sur-
prisingly but consistently, logical empiricists turn out to be in agreement 
with Driesch, and they defend the right to take vitalism seriously until 
disconfirmed by empirical evidence. Does vitalism impact the history of 
life science, and how? An affirmative answer might seem to imply the 
possible “legitimization” or “normalization” of what was thought to be a 
marginal or scientifically superfluous movement (see Crick, Gilbert and 
Sarkar), by seeking to inscribe it in a narrative of the development of 
biological science. The possibility of such an inscription allows of both 
66  Marlière 2009.
67  Wolfe 2011.
Authenticated | ctwolfe1@gmail.com author's copy
Download Date | 8/23/18 5:54 PM
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 20, 2018
Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of Lisbon University
Metaphysics, Function and the Engineering of Life: the Problem of Vitalism
134
a stronger and a weaker interpretation (as suggested via the example of 
Montpellier vitalism in section 2). The stronger case for vitalism is the 
sort made by partisans of e.g. theoretical biology whose anti-reduction-
ism is very zealous – a kind of non-negotiable commitment.68 The weaker 
case is easier to defend, because it is less directly falsifiable. It includes 
the more functional form of vitalism and contemporary work on biolog-
ical organization. The recursive claim that the synthesis of life (organic 
compounds in the case of the 19th century, DNA-based constructions, 
entire genomes, or protocells in the context of synthetic biology) would 
definitely discard the inconsistency of vitalism, has proved unfounded, as 
discussed in section 4. It relies on a historical and philosophical misun-
derstanding of the complex nature of vitalism, that can only be captured 
by considering its multiple figures. If the synthetic approach obviously 
repudiates nonmaterial vitalism, it is nonetheless consistent with func-
tional or organizational vitalism. Discussing the soundness of the per-
vasive mechanistic conception of life, and acknowledging the genuine 
features displayed by living beings not only question the validity of SB’s 
epistemological ground, those vitalist queries are also of heuristic value 
for SB’s own achievements. 
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